Opinion
Who should be concerned about the Iranian nuclear program?
1
Introduction
There is a growing concern of a conflict taking shape
between Israel and Iran, over Iran’s nuclear program suspected of having a
military dimension.
This investigation is not asking whether or not Iran is
striving to get the nuclear bomb. The underlying assumption is that it is. The
objective of this investigation is to come up with a comprehensive list of threats
and concerns derived from a nuclear Iran.
On March 5th, 2012, Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu delivered a speech to the AIPAC organization in Washington, it contained
the warning below:
”[Iran and its allies] could put a nuclear device in a ship
heading to any port or in a truck parked in any city, anywhere in the world”
[i].
Netanyahu is referring to the threat of Iran providing nuclear
material (also called the dirty bomb) to unscrupulous terrorist organizations
causing a radioactivity terror in a Western capital. This threat is one of five
different concerns that experts have been warning about, related to Iran’s
nuclear ambitions:
• Ballistic missile strike
• Proliferation and arms race in the
Middle East
• Increased Conventional Military Aggressions
• Disruption of oil supply
• Nuclear terrorism
Each one of these concerns is associated with a different region
of the world. Israel is definitely at the top of Iranian targets. But the Persian
Gulf, the larger Middle East, Europe and the United States are also under threat.
Firstly, the regional ambitions of the Iranian Mullah regime
must be explained. Its ambitions revolve around exporting the Shiite Islamic
revolution, clashing with Sunni Islam in a bitter competition.
Secondly, the concerns listed above will be reviewed in
terms of the motivations of the actors, the impacted geographic area, and the
likelihood that they occur.
2
The Regional Ambition of Iran
A lot can be inferred from Iran’s present view of the world,
while it is not a nuclear country. How would the possession of nuclear power change
its behavior?
Iran’s foreign policy is driven by essentially 2 priorities:
2.1
Economic independence
Iran’s economy is very much dependent on foreign assistance.
Iran has never been able to distance itself from the capitalist world and
develop an independent economic base. Historically, powerful nations like
Russia, Britain and the United States have been meddling in Iran’s internal
affairs interested in its natural resources. Despite having oil in abundant
quantity in its soil, Iran does not have any refineries and relies on gasoline
importations.
Fears and perception of foreign interference have formed the
basis of Iranian nationalism
[ii].
2.2
Regional supremacy
Iran sees itself as an essential actor in the Middle-East
and in particular in the Persian Gulf. A Shiite theocracy, the Mullah regime is
governed by religious leaders who believe it is their responsibility to export
the Islamic revolution. They envision a crescent of “Shia dominated governments
that will strengthen Iran and weaken the ability of the Sunni Arabs to self-defend.
[…]The crescent begins in Lebanon, continues through Syria, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran, and ends in Tajikistan.”
[iii]
Motivated by its regional imperialism, Iran is involved in proxy wars
against foreign actors whose influence is contrary to its ambition of exporting
the revolution:
• Iran is supporting insurgents in Iraq
and Afghanistan in order to counter the US presence in these two countries.
• Iran is involved in regional disputes
in Yemen, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates [UAE] often opposed to the powerful Wahhabi
regime of Saudi Arabia.
• Finally Israel is perceived as a
major power that can contradict Iran’s foreign policy. Iran has been constantly
trying to disrupt the Israel-Palestine peace process by supporting terrorists
groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza strip[iv].
Let’s examine how this attitude is impacting the region, one country at a time.
2.2.1 The
Sunni shiite Rivalry
The Sunni-Shiite rivalry has its roots in religious
competition dating back to the origins of Islam. The culture of hatred between
the two religious groups is as deep as the resentment for Israel by the Muslim
world.
The most powerful nations of the region dominated by Sunni
Islam are Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran is the largest country dominated
by Shia Islam. The rivalry is showing in regional conflicts between Iran and
Sunni Arab states and in particular with Saudi Arabia.
2.2.1.1 Saudi
Arabia
Saudi Arabia and Iran have been competing for influence in
the Middle East since the Iranian revolution. During the Iran-Iraq war, Riyadh
supported Baghdad diplomatically and financially.
Saudi Arabia is led by an ultra-conservative Islamic regime
following Wahhabi (or Salafist) Islam. Saudi Arabia is concerned that its own
Shiite minority of two million people, frustrated by years of repression and
discrimination, seeks to destabilize the regime with financial and military support
from Iran.
2.2.1.2 Koweit
Kuwait’s population includes 30-40 percent Shiites also
suffering from discrimination from the Sunni dominated government. Kuwait has
accused Iran of maintaining sleeper cells of terrorism ready to commit acts of
subversion if Iran’s nuclear plants were attacked
[v].
2.2.1.3 Iraq
Iraq just transitioned from a Sunni government under Saddam
Hussein to a Shia dominated government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Since
the appointment of this new government, Iran has improved its relations with
Iraq. This development has made the Saudis worried about “the emergence of an
anti-Saudi Shiite regime led by pro-Iranian politicians”
[vi].
Iran exerts its influence in Iraq through various Shiite
militia organizations, which engage in terrorism and military strikes against
U.S. troops and Iraqis opposed to these forces. Iran provides weapons, rockets
and road side bombs to the militias.
Iran has occasionally made military incursions into Iraqi
territory and bombarded Iraqi Kurdish villages
[vi].
2.2.1.4 Bahrain
Within the Gulf region, the island of Bahrain is currently
an important center of Saudi-Iranian political conflict. The ruling Sunni Royal
family reigns over a population composed of a Shiite majority and no more than
35 percent Sunni. Influenced by the Arab Spring, mass demonstrations took place
in February 2011 to obtain political, economic reforms and democracy, and to address
anti-Shiite discriminations and poverty. Saudi Arabia has been concerned about
the political emergence of the Shiite majority, that could collaborate with Iranian
military and intelligence organizations. Riyadh intervened to support the Sunni
government of Manama. This government accused Tehran of incenting the uprising,
and Hezbollah of training the opposition militarily. Tehran, furious, accused
the Saudis of occupying Bahrain and requested a UN intervention
[vi].
2.2.1.5 Yemen
The Yemen government has recently been destabilized by an
insurgency led by the Houthi minority in the North, which is of Shiite faith. Both
Saudi and Yemeni government leaders have frequently accused Iran of backing the
Houthi rebels with funding, training, and material aid. They claim that this
support may be provided from Lebanon by Hezbollah
[vi] [vii].
Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Northern Yemen during
the 2009-2010 Winter after the insurgents crossed into Saudi territory.
It should be noted that Yemen was the theater of an Al-Qaeda
led terrorist attack in October 2000, on the USS Cole destroyer, killing 17 US sailors,
in the port of Aden. The Obama administration has been providing support to the
Yemen government with drone strikes on the rebel militias and Al-Qaeda bases
[viii].
2.2.1.6 Syria
Syria has been governed by the Alawite repressive regime of
the Al-Assad’s (Hafez and Bashar) for 40 years. Syria and Libya were the only
two countries supporting Tehran in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran and Syria had in
common hostility towards Saddam Hussein and suspicion towards the USA. Iran has
always offered its support to Syria in the case of an Israel-Syria
confrontation, providing rockets and missile technology. Syria, Iran, Hamas and
Hezbollah refer to themselves as the “axis of resistance” against Israel.
The Saudi monarchy considers the Al-Assad a revolutionary
regime. The assassination of Sunni Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in
February 2005 struck a serious blow to the Syria-Saudi relations.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are watching closely the unfolding
of the Syrian uprising. The Syrian rebels have accused Iran and Hezbollah of
providing technical and tactical expertise to the Syrian government. For Iran,
losing Syria to the rebels would also mean losing a direct link with Hezbollah in Lebanon
[vi].
2.2.1.7 Lebanon
Lebanon is a small, weak state always caught between
influences of more powerful neighbours. After Saudi Arabia helped broker the
1989 Taif Accord that put an end to the civil war, Hezbollah became the only
faction that retained its armed militia and territorial pockets, where the
Lebanese Army was not welcome, such as the border with Israel and the Beqaa
valley. Keeping control of these regions allows for the trickle of weaponry
from the Syrian border destined to the South.
In June 2011, the pro-Saudi Saad Hariri government was
replaced by a government led by Najib Mikati and dominated by Hezbollah.
Iran maintains its influence over Hezbollah through lavish
financial and material aid. The Lebanese opposition sees Iran as an intruder
and meddler in Lebanese politics and seeks support from Saudi Arabia
[vi].
2.2.1.8 The
Palestinian territories
Iran wants to be perceived throughout the Muslim world “as
the leading militant power supporting Palestinian rights and opposing Israel,
through a variety of means, including supplying weapons and funding to
Palestinian Islamic militants”
[vi].
In January 2002, the Israeli Defense Force captured the
cargo Karine A, loaded with arms from Iran destined to the Arafat led
Palestinian Authority.
Under international pressure, Saudi Arabia has officially stopped
funding Hamas around 2009, letting Iran become the leading supplier of funding
and military equipment to Hamas. After the overthrow of Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, the weapon traffic towards the Gaza strip, originating in Iran,
has increased through the Sinai Peninsula.
2.3
Conclusion
Iran’s Middle East ambition of exporting the Islamist
revolution has led the regime to intervene in many regional conflicts, siding
with Shiite minorities, or against non-Islamic (“Infidel”) presence like Israel
and the United States. As a supporter of terrorism, Iran has been isolated and can
count on few friendly nations. Sanctions have caused its conventional military
force to be aging for lack of replacement parts. The acquisition of nuclear
power would be an asset in realizing its objectives. Let’s examine one by one
the concerns raised by its nuclear program:
• Ballistic missile strike
• Proliferation and arms race in the
Middle East
• Increased Conventional Military Aggressions
• Disruption of oil supply
• Nuclear terrorism
3
Ballistic missile Strike
The first threat that comes to mind, when considering Iran’s
acquisition of the bomb, is the possibility that Iran would launch a ballistic
missile, equipped with a nuclear head, towards a hostile country. The Iranian
government is aware that such a strike would very likely bring a retaliatory
strike of devastating proportion possibly annihilating a city like Tehran. No
one has ever used a nuclear strike since WWII. In other words, such a move
would be suicidal for the Mullah regime, therefore, analysts have been questioning whether
Iran is governed by a rational leadership
[ix].
Iranian President Ahmadinejad has often referred to an
apocalyptic view of Shia Islam. The prophecy describes a period of extreme suffering
that would bring the advent of a messianic figure, the hidden Imam or Mahdi.
In some instances of Ahmadinejad’s speeches, a precondition to the messianic prophecy
is that the State of Israel must be an annihilated. However, experts argue that
despite its apocalyptic discourse, Iran’s post-Revolution government has always
acted rationally and will continue to do so even with nuclear power in hands.
Michael Eisenstadt, from the Washington Institute for Middle
East policy, explains Iran’s rationality as follows:
“The perception, however, of Iran as an irrational, undeterrable
state with a high pain threshold is both anachronistic and wrong. Within the
context of a relatively activist foreign policy, Iranian decision makers have
generally sought to minimize risk by shunning direct confrontation and by
acting through surrogates (such as the Lebanese Hezbollah) or by means of
stealth (Iranian small boat and mine operations against shipping in the Gulf
during the Iran-Iraq War) in order to preserve deniability and create ambiguity
about their intentions. Such behavior is evidence of an ability to engage in
rational calculation and to accurately assess power relationships.”
[x].
Alan M. Dershowitz from the Harvard Law Schools raises
objections to the concept of “deterrence by mutually assured destruction”,
questioning “
whether any civilized
country—the United States or Israel—should be
willing to kill millions of Iranian civilians because their leaders made a
decision to use nuclear weapons against Israel or the United States” and
“whether it would be legal, under
the laws of war, to target millions of civilians in a retaliatory nuclear
attack”[xi].
In the case where deterrence is failing to stop Iran from
using its nuclear power, which country could be targeted?
Israel has been identified by the Mullah regime as the
number one target. The presence of a Jewish state at the heart of Daar al Islam
(the land of Islam) with Jerusalem for capital, which is also the third holiest
place in Islam, is simply unacceptable for the Iranian leaders.
Other targets of a direct nuclear strike in the Middle East could
be any nation that would oppose Iranian ambitions in expanding its Shia
influence, more likely a Sunni dominated regime like Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
Along with its nuclear development, Iran has been developing ballistic
missiles having increasing range capability. It is estimated that the current
generation of Shahab-3 missile has a range just short of Europe’s southern
flank from the Iranian territory, or 2100 km. European countries, having powerful
military capacity, that could try to disrupt Iran’s territorial ambitions like
France, UK or Germany, are currently out-of-range from Iran or even from Lebanon
or Syria. The territory of America is also out-of-range but not American bases
in the Gulf, in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The threat of an Iranian ballistic strike is mostly a concern for Israel,
for American troops in the Middle-East and for powerful Sunni dominated regimes
like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. If the Iranian leaders behave rationally,
deterrence by mutually assured destruction makes the threat unlikely. Still,
the fear of a nuclear Iran is pushing more Middle Eastern countries towards
acquiring nuclear power themselves.
4
The threat of Proliferation and Arms Race
Proliferation is by far the most discussed consequence of a
nuclear Iran. Distinction must be made between 2 kinds of proliferation:
• a technology transfer from Iran to an
ally
• an arms race amongst vulnerable
neighbours hostile to Iran
4.1
Technology transfer
The Iranian leaders have expressed their desire to share
their nuclear knowledge and experience in, at least, two occasions:
On September 15
th, 2005 during a meeting with
Turkish Erdogan at the UN General Assembly, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad conceded “Iran
is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their
need”
[xii].
On April 25
th, 2006 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated
to the Sudanese president: "Iran's nuclear capability is one example of
various scientific capabilities in the country. The Islamic Republic of Iran is
prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge and technology of its
scientists"
[xiii].
Sudan is one of the most unstable countries in Africa,
caught in a protracted conflict with South Sudan, having harboured notorious
terrorists like Osama Bin Laden, after he was expelled from Saudi Arabia. Nuclear
technology transfer to a country like Sudan would be a disaster.
Syria already tried to build secretly a nuclear plant that
was annihilated by Israel Air Force in September 2007. Syria chose to get its
technology transfer from North Korea, with perhaps some contribution from Iran
[xiv]
.
4.2
Arms Race
Experts are convinced that following in the footsteps of
Iran, a whole range of countries will pursue nuclear military power for their
own deterrence against the Iranian bomb.
J. S. Yaphe and C. D. Lutes propose a list of countries
potentially interested in nuclear power:
“Despite skepticism over falling dominos in the Middle East,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the Iranian case will affect choices
yet to be made by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey”
[xv].
Let’s examine the motivations behind each of these countries
listed by Yaphe & Lutes.
4.2.1 TURKEY
Turkey is widely seen as one country willing to go nuclear
after Iran. These comments about Turkey’s suspicion of striving for a nuclear umbrella were
written in 2005:
“Turks worry about the reliability of both NATO and U.S.
commitments to Turkish defense in Middle Eastern contingencies, and Turkey will
be strongly affected by changes in alliance strategy, missions, and cohesion,
all of which are in flux”
[x].
More precisely:
“The sources of Turkish concern are straightforward.
First, Turkey’s secular elites, including the military,
increasingly have been concerned about the export of Islamic radicalism from
Iran. […]
Second, Iran is a key player with regard to the Kurdish
issue in its regional setting, and relations on Kurdish matters continue to be
a leading barometer of Turkish-Iranian relations as a whole.[…]
Third, as noted earlier, Turkey increasingly has been
concerned about the influence of WMD and missile proliferation on the security
environment, its own regional freedom of action, and that of its alliance
partners.”
[x]
With Turkey now under the presidency of Erdogan, relationships
between Turkey and Europe have deteriorated for a few reasons:
• Turkey is sliding towards Islamism
• Tensions have appeared with Cyprus,
an EU member, and with Israel regarding gas fields in the Mediterranean sea
• Tensions were renewed with Israel
regarding the Gaza flotilla that included the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship, intercepted by Israel on
May 30th, 2010.
So the remark regarding Turkey’s suspicion of its European
alliance is all the more accurate today.
Turkey’s nuclear acquisition could be the trigger of more
proliferation:
“Already within range of the current Shahab missile, Ankara
could decide to pursue its own nuclear agenda to counterbalance a nuclear-armed
Iran. This would place original NATO members in a precarious position in regard
to their southernmost NATO ally and probably would be more destabilizing than a
nuclear-protected Gulf. While unlikely to spur additional nuclear proliferation
in the European region, Turkish nuclear weapons acquisition could increase
tension within the NATO alliance and raise pressure on the Gulf States to do
the same.”
[xv].
4.2.2 THE
GULF STATES
The term “Gulf States”, here, includes all the countries
surrounding the Gulf of Hormuz outside of Iran: It is comprised of Iraq plus
the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman.
In the section describing Iran’s ambitions, some Gulf States
were shown to be involved in regional disputes with Iran. For theses Gulf
States, the alternative consisting in relying on a nuclear umbrella provided by
the USA places them in an uncomfortable position:
“Opposition to American occupation of Iraq is a common cry
in the Gulf, and no Gulf government wants to appear to be providing the United
States with military bases, assistance, or access to facilities. Moreover,
reliance on the United States for defence against other regional states has
come to be seen by many in the region as an admission that regimes are
incapable of providing for the national security.”
[xv].
Providing for their national security without the United
States is an incentive for the Gulf States to get their own nuclear power.
Clifford D. May provides reasons for the Gulf States to go
nuclear:
“A nuclear-armed Iran would challenge the Saudi clan’s claim
to be the rightful guardian of [the holy cities of] Mecca and Medina and embolden
Arabia’s Shia minority. It would threaten the small states in the region, the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain among them. It would dominate Iraq
(where its influence has been growing as American forces have withdrawn) and
Afghanistan (from which American forces soon will withdraw).”
[xvi]
4.2.3 SYRIA
The case of Syria is currently unpredictable. Syria has
already made an attempt to build a nuclear plant that was destroyed by Israeli
Air Force in September 2007. Syrian president Bashar al Assad is caught in a
civil war. The outcome of that war could be a pro-Iranian Alawite regime or a
Sunni regime. Some Sunni rebels have expressed sympathy for Israel and could
dramatically alter Syria’s foreign policy, cutting its support to Hezbollah in
Lebanon (who is widely perceived as having participated in the massacres of
Syrian civilians). A Sunni Syrian government could sign a peace agreement with
Israel that includes a nuclear umbrella. These are just speculations
[xvii].
4.2.4 EGYPT
The same uncertainty exists regarding post-Mubarak Egypt.
“Egypt had incentive to contemplate nuclear weapons well
before Iran’s nuclear weapons came to the foreground in regional politics. The
Egyptians, notwithstanding the peace treaty with Israel, have long resented
Israel’s nuclear weapons program that they see as a substantial source of
Israeli political leverage over Egypt and the other Arab states. Cairo has long
pressed diplomatically for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East as a means to
negotiate away Israel’s unilateral nuclear weapons advantage in the region.
Cairo has long warned that it could reconsider its nuclear weapons restraint if
the Israelis indefinitely refuse to negotiate for a nuclear free zone.”
[x]
The Arab Spring has led Egypt to general elections. These
elections are spread over several months and the outcome is currently unknown.
A victory by Islamist party Muslim Brotherhood would bring a government in
friendly terms with Iran, contrary to Mubarak who was hostile.
It should be noted that Arab’s concern about Israel’s nuclear
capability is widely seen as fuelling more nuclear arm race. I would argue that
when the Arab coalition launched the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Israel already had
the nuclear bomb. This did not deter Egypt and Syria to launch that war. By
contrast with Iran, Israel is unanimously perceived as a rational democratic
country that would not use its nuclear arsenal unless its survival was at
stake. Besides, the close geographic proximity of Israel with many of its
enemies like Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Syria combined with the randomness of
radioactive contaminations (affected by the wind direction) makes Israel’s
nuclear deterrence futile with neighbours in proximity.
4.3
Conclusion
Technology transfer of nuclear know-how has been a concern
for the Western world in prior instances and coming from Asian nations. North
Korea has demonstrated it is willing to transgress the rules with Syria. The
father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, A. Q. Khan has been accused of leading an
international proliferation network
[xviii]
[xix].
Therefore, Iran, having expressed its willingness to share its knowledge, must
be taken seriously.
A natural response to Iran’s nuclear threat, for many Middle
Eastern countries, is to acquire nuclear power themselves. The fear of a domino
effect is real.
Nevertheless, embolden by its newly acquired non-conventional
power, Iran could assert its foreign policy more aggressively, using
conventional military power to limit the risk of retaliations.
5
Increased Conventional Military Agressions
Nuclear power is a convincing argument for Iran to resolve regional
disputes by force rather than negotiations. Small Arab states in the Gulf that
are not willing to acquire nuclear weapons would be particularly vulnerable. The
United Arab Emirates is one such example:
“The UAE perceives the Iranians as a threat more acutely
than their Gulf Arab counterparts. The UAE still harbors resentment toward the
Iranians for their occupation of the contested territories of Greater and
Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands. The UAE might calculate that Iran’s nuclear
weapons will reduce, if not eliminate, what little incentive Tehran has to
negotiate a settlement to the island disputes, as well as embolden Tehran to
take even more assertive actions against the UAE.”
[x].
Sokolski and Clawson suggest a list of regional issues for
which Iran could apply a more aggressive policy:
“With a real or virtual nuclear arsenal
at its disposal, Iran’s leaders may be emboldened to take more aggressive steps
to assert its pre-eminence and to weaken competitors. A few examples include:
Saudi Arabia.
Iran will resist Saudi efforts to
step up oil production in order to lower world oil prices, and will want Saudi
Arabia to feel the heat of Iran’s new power. A nuclear ready Iran could feel emboldened
to step up its support for Saudi terrorist groups and direct them to sabotage
or otherwise attack Saudi oil installations, should the Saudis refuse to
decrease production.
Iraq.
The Iranian government pursued an
aggressive campaign of subversion against the Iraqi Governing Council following
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. It supported renegade Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, beamed
anti-American propaganda into Iraq on 42 Arabic-language radio and television
stations, and built a network of social services in southern Iraq that bested
those provided by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC). A nuclear-ready Iran could step up subversion inside Iraq
(attacks on oil installations, U.S. and Iraqi forces), with the goals of scaling
back Iraqi oil exports, driving the United States to withdraw its troops, and
preventing the emergence of a strong central Iraqi government that could
challenge Iran.
Qatar.
Iran is competing with Qatar to
attract international investment to develop a massive shared gas field in the
Persian Gulf. (The Iranians refer to the offshore gas field as South Pars; the
Qataris call it the North Dome.) They are also competing to supply natural gas
to India and Pakistan. Fear of a natural gas “glut” could lead Iran to seek to
limit foreign investment in Qatari gas projects.
Turkey.
Iran’s main economic competitor
in the region is Turkey. Should Turkey’s secular parties or the military
replace the current Islamic governing party, Iran could resume its support for
Islamic terrorist groups to destabilize Turkey.
U.S. bases
[Iran could renew] calls to end
the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which the Islamic Republic
views as a direct challenge to its predominance. The Islamic Republic has long
sought to force the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the Gulf.”
[x]
Countries that currently host U.S. military bases in the
Gulf are: Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Bahrain, and Oman.
5.1
Conclusion
Protected by the deterrence provided by its nuclear
umbrella, it would be natural for Iran to increase conventional military
aggressions in order to fulfill its regional ambitions.
J. S. Yaphe and C. D. Lutes object with a belief in enhanced
deterrence:
“An Iran emboldened by nuclear weapons might become more
assertive in the region, but superior U.S. conventional capabilities and
strengthened regional partnerships would probably deter Iran from significant
mischief, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking U.S. forces
directly.”
[xv]
Cutting the oil supply in the Strait of Hormuz is a leverage
that Iran could use to artificially boost the price of oil. Let’s examine this
option.
6
Disruption of oil supply
In January 2012, Iran threatened to close the Strait of
Hormuz after a US airplane carrier, the USS Stennis, sailed into the North Arabian
Sea. Iranian officials have threatened to blockade the strait if an oil embargo
is imposed, by Europe and the USA, in response to the Iranian nuclear program.
Such a move would prevent Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates from exporting oil and gas. Asian nations like China, Japan, India,
South Korea rely heavily on oil from the Gulf but Europe and the United States
have somewhat diversified their sources.
The oil embargo of 2012 from the US and Europe went ahead
anyway
[xx].
Most Middle East analysts do not believe that Iran can completely close the
strait. They claim that closing the strait would penalize Iran’s oil export
based economy more than everyone else’s. Unless underwater mines are used, why could not
Iran stop all boat traffic except the tankers bound for Iran?
The Gulf closure would raise the oil price artificially and would be
considered a casus belli by the USA and China thus triggering a military
reaction. Deterrence is currently working against a full blockade of the Strait.
Would it still be the case if Iran had the nuclear bomb?
Analysts believe a partial blockade is a stronger
possibility. They have considered its usage by Iran as a retaliatory measure to
an external aggression or to gain leverage in a localized dispute (the Islands
of Abu Musa and Tunbs are claimed by both Iran and the UAE)
[xxi].
Iranians can use small boats, mines, submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles and
divers to disrupt the traffic in the strait, to cause nuisance or target a
specific country
[xxii].
Iranians have attacked Kuwaiti tankers carrying oil for Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war. An American frigate was hit by an Iranian mine in 1988. This
caused a series of incidents between Iran and the USA.
Iran has only ever threatened to blockade the Strait
of Hormuz like in early 2012. As fragile economies were weary of an increase in
oil price, Iran was hoping for the world community to diffuse the crisis by
withdrawing sanctions against its economy. That did not work. Iran has, in some
instances, harassed a selected set of tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, belonging to a
targeted nation.
6.1
Conclusion
If Iran was in possession of nuclear capabilities, the
Islamic Republic could use a partial or complete blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, in a
situation where the world community was to interfere in its foreign policy, for
example by impeding Iran’s attempt to export its Islamist revolution to a place
like Iraq, Syria or Lebanon:
“Some Iranian decision makers might believe that “the bomb” might
provide them with a free hand to take such steps with relative impunity, by
deterring an effective response by its neighbors or the United States.”
[x].
Another tool that the Iranian regime has been using, for a
long time, to destabilize its enemies is terrorism by proxy. How would
terrorist factions make use of nuclear power provided by Iran?
7
Nuclear terrorism
7.1
Various Delivery modes
The idea behind nuclear terrorism is to trigger a small
nuclear bomb or to disperse radioactive material within an urban area and
produce fear of radioactive contamination (in addition to the damage caused by
the explosion). Michael Eisenstadt has considered various ways of delivering
the material:
“[Iran could] deliver nonconventional weapons against targets in the
Middle East and beyond, by aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles, and by
various non-traditional means such as ship-based ballistic missiles, unmanned
aerial vehicles, boats, and terrorists.
[Iran] might produce nuclear naval mines and nuclear-tipped anti-ship
missiles (for use against U.S. aircraft carriers), and perhaps eventually, man
portable nuclear devices (the so-called, but inaccurately labeled, “suitcase
nukes”) for use by Iranian special forces or foreign terrorist groups aligned
with Tehran.”
[x].
The “suitcase nukes” scenario refers to the situation where terrorists
detonate a small nuclear bomb. It presents the following difficulties
[xxiii]:
Terrorists must steal, purchase or be given the radioactive material by a
rogue state. The risk of retaliation on that state is about as high as in the
case of a ballistic nuclear strike.
Transportation is an issue. At least 10 kg of material must be delivered
to the target destination.
Detonating a nuclear bomb requires nanosecond accurate synchronization to
cause a chain reaction.
By contrast, an easier way to cause terror is the “dirty bomb” containing
radioactive material.
This scenario is logistically much easier to implement and the
psychological impact very high. Various radioactive products may be used from
medical to military origin. They may be dispersed by an explosion, in the air
or by water contamination. The only risk for the terrorist is exposure to
radioactivity which is irrelevant for a shahid (a martyr or suicide
bomber).
The nuclear terrorism threat should be taken seriously as it has already been attempted:
It is believed that Osama bin Laden tried to obtain nuclear material
[xxiv].
The Iraqi government has tested in 1987 a radioactive dispersion bomb
[xxv].
In the current context, which terrorists groups affiliated to Iran would
be candidates for nuclear terrorism and who would be the target?
7.2
Iran’s collaboration with terrorist groups
The 1979 Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini led to the
hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran. Since then, Iran has been
supporting terrorists groups in various parts of the world, both Shiite and
Sunni.
7.2.1 HEZBOLLAH
Hezbollah is a Shiite terrorist organization based in
Lebanon and a political member of the Lebanese government. Its objective is, in
high priority, to resist Israel’s “occupation of Lebanese territory” and, in
lower priority, to dominate Lebanese politics in order to create an Islamic
state on the model of Iran
[xxvi]
[xxvii].
It claims that Israel occupies a Lebanese territory called “the Sheba farms” at
the foothills of the Golan Heights, under Syrian sovereignty until 1973. It
has received extensive support from Iran: financial support, military support
including rockets and missiles but also training in Iran and assistance from
Revolutionary Guards, inside Lebanon, in particular during the 2006 war against
Israel.
Hezbollah has been constantly trying to disrupt the
Israel-Palestine peace process. It has successfully harmed Israeli, American,
French interests and is behind the following terrorist attacks:
• Explosion of the US Embassy, US
Marine and French barracks in Lebanon in 1983
• Bombing of Israeli and Jewish targets
in Argentina in 1992 and 1994
• Hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985
• Assassination of Lebanese President
Rafic Hariri in 2005
• Bombing targeting Israeli diplomats in
Bangkok and New Delhi in 2012[xxviii]
Hezbollah operates worldwide. It is a good candidate for
nuclear terrorism targeting Israeli interests. Due to the proximity of Israel
with Lebanon, a delivery by speed boat or unmanned aircraft over the border is
easily conceivable.
7.2.2 HAMAS
Hamas in Gaza is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood founded
in Egypt. The brotherhood is an Islamist political party of Egypt that has been
gaining strength since the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak. In Gaza, the
Hamas constitutes the government and a terrorist group. The Gaza strip harbours
terrorist movements like Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyrs, Qassam Brigade, and
the Popular Resistance Committee. The Hamas has carried out terrorist acts
itself. All these militia are targeting mostly Israeli interests using
terrorist attacks inside its borders or launching rockets from Gaza. Despite
being Sunni Islamist, they also benefit, like Hezbollah, from Iranian support
financially and militarily, having a common enemy, Israel and to a lesser
extend the USA.
The most spectacular terrorist attacks from one of these
groups are:
• Islamic Jihad: Attack on a bus in
1989 and again in 1990
• Hamas: Explosion of a bus in Afula in
1994
• Islamic Jihad: Suicide bombing of a
Tel Aviv night club in 2001
• Hamas: Explosion of a Netanya hotel
in 2002
• Islamic Jihad: Suicide bombing of a
Haifa restaurant in 2003
• Popular resistance Committee:
Incursion from Sinai followed by bus attack in 2011
Hamas is a potential threat from nuclear terrorism against Israel using a
dirty bomb, a speedboat or an unmanned aerial vehicle.
7.2.3 AL
QAEDA
Al Qaeda is waging global jihad worldwide against interests of the
Western world.
Al Qaeda has allegedly received, from Iran and Hezbollah, training in
explosives, intelligence and document forgery. Iran facilitated the transit of
al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan including the 9/11 hijackers
[xxix].
The movement has successfully executed the following terrorist acts
[xxx]:
• The Khobar Tower bombing in Saudi
Arabia in 1996 (Saudi Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda cooperation)
• The USS Cole in Yemen in 2002
• The Bali night club bombing in 2002
• The Madrid train bombing in 2004 (al
Qaeda inspired)
• The London subway bombing in 2005
• The September 11th, 2011
attack on American soil
Al Qaeda has previously attempted to obtain radioactive material
[xxxi].
The potential targets could be any European or American interest at home or
abroad. Al Qaeda has shown innovation in delivering a terrorist attack: Richard
Reid, the “shoe bomber” attempted to bomb an American Airlines flight in 2001
using explosive in his shoes and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “underwear
bomber” attempted to bomb a Northwest Airlines flight in 2009 using liquid
explosive. These examples show the efforts to elude explosive detection devices
and come up with new ideas to produce maximum damage. The dirty bomb is one such
idea.
7.3
Conclusion
Despite objections that nuclear terrorism has never been attempted before
[xxxii],
the terrorist groups listed above have shown resourcefulness to find ways of inflicting
damage and terrorizing populations. Nuclear terrorism seems like an option they
could consider. The possible targets would be Israel and the Western world.
8
General Conclusion
One characteristic of the Middle East is how quickly an
assessment becomes obsolete: five years ago, Turkey and Egypt would have been
perceived as allies of Israel in an Israel-Iran confrontation. With the
likelihood of a Muslim Brotherhood government emerging from Egyptian elections
and with Islamist President Erdogan in power in Turkey, the alliance between
Israel, Egypt and Turkey is, to say the least, shaky. Making predictions as the
Arab Spring’s dust has not settled, in particular, in Syria, must be done with
extreme cautions.
Predicting the behavior of the Iranian leaders is also a
challenge:
“Nevertheless, the lack of confirmable information on Iran’s
leaders, particularly on how they make decisions, what they fear, if they have
a concept of deterrence, or whether they appreciate implicit redlines set by
countries with whom they have no contact—the United States and Israel—makes
forecasting this issue very difficult.”
[xv]
Despite these limitations, the concerns listed below have
been identified as consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear power.
|
Threat
|
Agent
|
Target
|
Motivation
|
|
Ballistic Strike
|
Iran
|
Israel, US bases
|
Apocalyptic conception of Islam, Retaliation
|
|
Proliferation and Arms race
|
The Gulf
States, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan
|
Iran
|
Deterrence
against Iran’s bomb or Technology transfer from Iran
|
|
Increased Conventional Military Aggression
|
Iran
|
Gulf States, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel
|
Regional Ambitions
|
|
Disruption of oil supply
|
Iran
|
Gulf States, Asian market
|
Regional Ambitions
|
|
Nuclear terrorism
|
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas
|
Israel, Europe, United States
|
Global Jihad
|
Although quasi-suicidal, a limited ballistic nuclear strike
on Israel or an American base in the Persian Gulf cannot be ignored.
The natural reaction of Middle-East actors to Iran becoming a nuclear power would be a
proliferation of nuclear countries while Iran could share its knowledge with
allied states. Alternatively, Arab nations could lobby for a denuclearized
Middle-East and would probably meet fierce opposition from Israel.
Iran could take advantage of its military superiority to
achieve its dream of exporting the Islamist revolution creating a Shia
dominated crescent covering Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and
Iran. It could destabilize opponents to its ambitions by disrupting the oil
supply or launching a wave of nuclear terrorist attacks.
In the case where boycott and sanctions fail to stop Iran’s
nuclear program, the next responses are:
• accepting to live with the threat,
existential for Israel, manageable for the rest of the world
• launching a strike on nuclear installations
and missile bases in Iran
8.1
Which country should be the one to deliver a blow to Iran’s nuclear
program?
I don’t believe it is Israel’s job to eliminate the threat
from Iran. Israel is the 5th largest military power, but the country
has no geographic depth, and is surrounded with hostile countries on all sides.
In the case of a strike, it will have to deal with the reaction of Iranian
proxy militias (Hezbollah and Hamas), a possible chemical or bacteriological
strike from Syria, and hostile reactions from the Muslim world (Egypt, Jordan,
Palestinian Territories). If it went at it alone, it would send the wrong
message that the Iranian threat is a threat for Israel only. The USA suffers
from the same kind of hostility from the Arab world after the long wars of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and should not accomplish the mission on its own either, as
the mission would be perceived as an offensive from the “Infidels” onto the
Muslim world.
When Saddam Hussein's troops invaded Kuwait, the Western world sent a
coalition led by the USA and including Arab nations to liberate Kuwait. Even if
some Arab countries’ contribution was just symbolic, their presence gave a
meaning to the intervention that it was a war against a dictator’s imperialist
move. Similarly, the intervention in Libya was led by a European coalition
against a dictator oppressing its own citizens.
A strike on Iran’s nuclear installations, avoiding civilian
targets at all costs, should be executed by a similar coalition that excludes
Israel but includes the USA, European nations and Arabic nations, because
Iran’s nuclear program represents a threat for the free world.
